Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the

sustained focus this week on Iran and the challenge that it presents.

We want to welcome——

General, thank you. Doctor, thank you. As I told

you in the anteroom, I purchased your book, with my own funds.

And I haven’t read it. I was about to admit that.

But I’ll tell you, when you have that book in your office on a coffee

table and you get visitors, it impresses them. I want you to know

that. [Laughter.]

So now I get——

The next time you appear you’ll have to quiz me

and see if I actually got to it. But I’ll do my best.

But it’s instructive for us on this committee to have a book like

that and have resources like that in your testimony today, and I

know this isn’t the only testimony you’re providing today. But we’re

grateful for your service to the country and for your continuing

work on these difficult issues.

I wanted to try to get to maybe three issues rather quickly, but

the first one probably taking the majority of the time. That’s on

sanctions. We read about as citizens and as Senators stories and

analyses about how sanctions are working or not working in the

context of Iran. I guess I’d ask you generally, based upon your

knowledge of this particular challenge, but also more broadly your

experience in foreign affairs in similar circumstances, to evaluate

the efficacy or effectiveness of the sanctions to date, mostly of

course in the Bush Administration; and then also what your rec-

ommendations would be or how would you construct sanctions

going forward with regard to Iran, in the context of obviously the

Security Council, but also what our government does and says in

the context of what sanctions can work.

We know that the financial sanctions and that isolation becomes

part of this, but also refining capacity. That’s always put on the

table as probably a lot more serious step to take. Please give us

your evaluation of where we are on sanctions and where we should

be headed?

Doctor.

I wanted to ask you about the question of how

we talk and the strategy that’s employed to make sure that any

kind of effort to have a new approach to talking, whether it’s bilateral

or multilateral. If you were designing the next 6 months, so

to speak, of our policy, how would you design it and what would

the structure be for how to construct a process to make sure that

talking and engagement leads to results that you can identify, you

can almost quantify? We know this administration has a different

point of view than the prior administration about engaging Iran,

how would you, if you were designing it construct it?

I know I’m out of time by a minute, so we can

move on.